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I. Introduction

T

here is an ongoing debate as to how to make the law of armed conflict
(LOAC) and human rights law (HRsL) interoperable. The International
Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC’s) Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law has complicated that process.1 This article seeks to explain why there is a problem and to
propose possible solutions. It only deals with the specific issues of targeting and
opening fire. It does not address the issue of detention.2 Before embarking on that
examination, it is first necessary to identify a range of assumptions and assertions
on which the analysis will be based. Certain distinctions within LOAC will then
be explored, because of their impact on the rules on targeting. The article will
then examine how the decision to open fire is analyzed under HRsL. Options
available to make LOAC and HRsL interoperable will be considered before finally
suggesting a solution.
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DPH and the Interoperability of LOAC and Human Rights Law
II. Assumptions and Assertions
This section identifies certain issues relevant to the discussion that, for reasons of
length, it will not be possible to discuss in any detail.
The Applicability of LOAC Does Not Have the Effect of Making HRsL
Inapplicable3
There is overwhelming evidence to support this general proposition, including two
advisory opinions and one judgment in a contentious case of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ).4 The ICJ has suggested that, when both bodies of rules are
applicable, LOAC is the lex specialis.5 It is unclear as yet both precisely what this
means and also how it is to be operationalized.6 While the United States and Israel
have argued that the applicability of LOAC displaces that of HRsL, it appears unlikely that they can claim to be “persistent objectors.”7
One of the most important implications of the co-applicability of LOAC and
HRsL is that bodies charged with monitoring compliance with HRsL would appear
to have the competence to assess whether a killing was a breach of HRsL, even if
they have to interpret HRsL in the light of LOAC. The bodies in question include
not only monitoring mechanisms that owe their authority ultimately to the United
Nations Charter, such as the UN Special Procedures mechanisms,8 but also monitoring bodies established under treaties. Those likely to have the most impact in
practice are treaty bodies, which can receive individual complaints and deliver
binding legal judgments—in other words, the three regional human rights courts.9
This does not mean that the opinions of other bodies, notably the Human Rights
Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are not
important.10 The jurisdiction of the regional human rights courts may be limited
on other grounds, most notably the uncertain scope of the extraterritorial applicability of HRsL.
The Scope of the Extraterritorial Applicability of HRsL
Unlike the first issue, this question is far from settled.11 It appears to be clear that
States have to apply their human rights obligations in territory that they occupy, at
least in the case of stable or settled occupation.12 It is also well established that
States have to apply their human rights obligations to persons in their physical
control, such as detainees.13 What is not clear is the extent to which a State’s human rights obligations apply to acts within the control of State agents where the
harm to the victim is foreseeable but the victim is not within their physical control.
Such a situation arises when the armed forces of State A in State B deliberately fire
at X from a distance of eight hundred yards or intentionally strike a building in
188
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State B, knowing that there are a number of civilians inside, even if they do not
know their names.14
This issue, unlike the previous question, arises purely as a matter of HRsL; it
has nothing to do with the co-applicability of LOAC. It only arises in the case of
those human rights treaty bodies whose competence is limited to alleged victims
“within the jurisdiction” of the respondent State.15 The UN Special Procedures
and the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, in exercising its functions
under the Organization of American States Charter, are not subject to such a limitation.16 To date, this restriction on the scope of jurisdiction has been most significant in the case of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHRs) and, to a lesser
extent, the UN Human Rights Committee. Important cases, arising out of the
conflict in, and occupation of, Iraq in and after 2003 and the conflict between
Georgia and Russia in 2008, are currently pending before the former body. It may
clarify that Court’s currently incoherent caselaw.17 It requires a rational path to be
found between two equally objectionable extremes. It seems self-evident that a
State should not be allowed to do extraterritorially what it is prohibited from doing within its own borders.
It is equally obvious that a State should not be found responsible for acts, omissions and situations over which it exercises no control. An important distinction in
HRsL, that between positive and negative obligations, might be relevant in this
context. By “negative obligations” is meant the obligation to respect a right, usually
by not doing something prohibited. The State also has an obligation to protect individuals from the risk of a right being violated. This requires the State to take measures to protect the individual from potential harm at the hands of State agents or
third parties. It represents a positive obligation to protect. The nature of certain
rights means that the positive obligation can only be fulfilled by the State exercising
the type of control it is expected to have in national territory. The delivery of the
right to education requires machinery for setting up schools, training teachers,
paying teachers and providing various materials. It is self-evident that State A, engaged in a military operation in State B, cannot deliver such a right to the population. The situation would be different if the armed forces were in effective control
of part of the State’s territory over a significant period of time and failed to address
in any way the educational needs of the population, or if State A’s forces, present in
State B with the consent of the State, failed to protect schools from foreseeable attack. This might suggest that the only relevant test is one of situational control.
While that is certainly relevant, it is inadequate to address certain situations when
the State freely chooses to undertake an act that it could not do lawfully in its own
territory. Take the example of State A, which is engaged in a military operation in
State B, but which is not in control of the territory in which it is fighting. Its armed
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DPH and the Interoperability of LOAC and Human Rights Law
forces deliberately fire on X at a distance of eight hundred yards. They are not in
physical control of X. They are, however, in control of the acts of the armed forces
whose behavior is decisive in determining whether or not X is killed. The issue concerns a negative obligation, the obligation not to use potentially lethal force except
in defined circumstances. The State does not require elaborate machinery in order
to deliver the right; its agents simply have to refrain from opening fire.
It should be remembered that, while much of the discussion of the issue concerns the control exercised by the State acting extraterritorially, the treaty language
does not require the alleged perpetrator to be within the control of the State. It requires that the victim should be within the jurisdiction of the respondent State. It
should also be remembered that the question here is not whether the situation
should be analyzed in terms of HRsL or LOAC but whether HRsL is applicable at
all. If it is not, certain human rights bodies do not have jurisdiction. If they do have
jurisdiction, a second and separate question arises. The body then has to determine
whether its analysis of HRsL has to be undertaken in the light of LOAC. That might
mean that there was a violation of HRsL only if there were a violation of LOAC. In
effect, but not in form, the human rights body would then be enforcing LOAC. It
could only do so, however, if it had jurisdiction.
This article will not discuss the issue further but it must be borne in mind
throughout the subsequent discussion. It has significant implications for the extent
of the problem of co-applicability.
The Geographical Scope of the Applicability of LOAC
Historically, there seems to have been an assumption that LOAC applied throughout the territory of the State involved in the conflict or in whose territory the conflict was occurring.18 In the case of international armed conflicts (IACs),
geographical limitations on the scope of applicability of LOAC may be achieved in
other ways. For example, during the Gulf War 1990–91, the coalition forces appear
not to have targeted roads and bridges in Iraqi Kurdistan. They were not used to
contribute to the Iraqi military effort and their destruction or neutralization would
therefore not have delivered a definite military advantage.19 In IACs, it may be
preferable to assume that LOAC applies throughout the relevant territories and to
use the definition of a military objective to limit the geographical scope of the fighting on a factual basis.
The situation in the case of non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) is significantly different, whether the State is a party to the conflict or not.20 Although it is
important that forces needing the protection of LOAC should get it, it is equally
important that a LOAC paradigm should only be used when it is necessary. Emergency measures that are genuinely required are usually accepted, however
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reluctantly, by the majority of the population. That population is, however, likely
to be alienated by reliance on emergency measures not perceived to be necessary.
On that basis, NIAC rules should apply to those parts of the territory in which
fighting is occurring and to conflict-related activities in other parts of the territory.
Imagine, for example, that there is a conflict in one province of State A. It introduces internment or administrative detention as an emergency measure. That
should not apply to the detention of individuals in other provinces, unless an individual is detained there on account of activities in the province where the conflict is
occurring.
The caselaw of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) suggests support for both the general applicability of LOAC throughout
the territory and also a more restricted geographical scope for the applicability of
NIAC rules.21 A study of State practice, at least with regard to NIACs within the territory of the State, might suggest a more restrictive approach. As a matter of impression, when a conflict is only occurring in part of its territory, a State often only
declares a state of emergency in those parts of national territory affected by the conflict.22 That may be principally the product of domestic, notably constitutionallaw, concerns or of HRsL, but that would not exclude its possible relevance to the
applicability of LOAC.23
The process of establishing customary law in NIACs is far more complicated
than in IACs. In IACs, the whole of the relevant discourse is through the vocabulary of LOAC. That is the principal source of international legal obligations.24 Domestic law is likely to be of limited relevance, particularly to extraterritorial
conduct.25 In the case of internal NIACs, the constraints on the conduct of the domestic authorities are principally articulated through domestic law and HRsL.
Confining emergency measures to the parts of the territory where the conflict is
occurring and conflict-related activities elsewhere may be the approach currently
favored by human rights bodies dealing with derogation during states of emergency.26 Initially, the ECtHRs emphasized that, in order to justify derogating at all,
the threat had to be to “the life of the nation” as a whole.27 This might have been
thought to imply that the conflict had to be occurring everywhere, thereby justifying the applicability of LOAC everywhere. More recently, the ECtHRs has addressed the situations in Northern Ireland and southeast Turkey.28 At no point was
the argument raised that the two States could not derogate because the conflict was
only occurring in part of their territories. At the same time, when dealing with cases
arising in other parts of the respective States, neither the State itself nor the Court
suggested that they should apply the emergency measures in those other areas.
When the applicability of LOAC depends, among other elements, on the level or
intensity of the violence, as is the case with Common Article 3 to the Geneva
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Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol II of 1977, it is already the case that
the applicability can vary at different times. That may be relevant when determining whether a geographical limitation to the applicability of NIAC rules is, in principle, acceptable.
In the rest of the article, it will be assumed that NIAC rules only apply to the areas of the territory in which the conflict is occurring and to conflict-related issues
elsewhere. In other parts of the territory, domestic law, including relevant human
rights obligations of the State, will be applicable.
The Function of Legal Rules in Situations of Armed Conflict
The law does not exist to remove the decision-making authority of the military
commander from him. The law determines the bottom line, below which conduct
is unlawful. Just because conduct is not unlawful does not make it wise or apt for
achieving the military purpose. It is possible that a commander could be prosecuted on this basis, under national military law, for action that did not constitute
an international crime.29
The flip side of these propositions is that the law cannot be based on a best-case
scenario. In normal circumstances, a decision on opening fire is based on a law and
order paradigm.30 That means that it should be taken as a last resort and based on
the behavior of the person targeted. It is dependent on the immediacy and severity
of the threat that person poses at the time. In most situations of armed conflict, that
is inappropriate as a bottom line. It may well be that most of the time and in most
of the territory, even during an emergency, a law and order paradigm is appropriate, but in other situations it will not be. Rules are more likely to deliver the desired
result if they are suited to the situation in which they are to be applied and for
which they have been designed. In other words, just as in peacetime it is in everyone’s interest, including that of military forces, to limit decisions on opening fire to
a law and order paradigm, in many situations of armed conflict it is in everyone’s
interest, including that of the civilian population, for such decisions to be based on
a LOAC paradigm.
These principles need to inform the operationalization of the relationship between HRsL and LOAC. To assert an unrealistic protection of civilians in situations
of armed conflict based on HRsL is not likely to enhance their protection but rather
to result in unrealizable expectations on the part of civilians and in increased violation of the rules on the part of the armed forces. If some rules are perceived to be
unrealistic, this is likely to lessen respect for those rules that can be applied in practice. This is not to argue that at the first sound of gunfire LOAC should displace
HRsL. The circumstances in which an armed conflict paradigm should replace a
law and order paradigm will be considered further below. All that is being asserted
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here is, first, that there are circumstances in NIACs when LOAC is the more appropriate paradigm and, second, just because the law allows a soldier to open fire does
not mean that it is necessarily the right thing to do in a particular situation in which
LOAC is applicable.
III. Distinctions within LOAC Relevant to the Rules on Targeting
and Opening Fire
Three distinctions need to be considered here: first, that between Hague law and
Geneva law; second, that between treaty law and custom; and, third, that between
the literal meaning of “direct participation in hostilities” (DPH) and the ICRC’s
Interpretive Guidance.
Hague Law and Geneva Law
Before 1977 and the adoption of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, particularly Protocol I on international armed conflicts, any discussion took the distinction between Hague law and Geneva law for granted. The rules
were usually to be found in different treaties, making the distinction both necessary and relatively straightforward. The usual way of describing the substantive
content of the rules was that Hague law dealt with means and methods of fighting
and Geneva law with the protection of victims who were, by definition, in the power
of the other side. In fact, the rules were even more distinct than this might suggest.
Hague law and Geneva law functioned differently as legal subsystems. This was a
product of the issues with which each dealt, but it went much deeper than that.
For reasons of brevity, it will be necessary to discuss the differences by way of
sweeping generalizations. Even if they may be subject to criticism, that does not
mean that there is not an essential truth at their heart. Hague law is directed to the
military operator. It guides his decision making at the time. It deals principally with
the places where, and times when, fighting is occurring. The rules tend to identify
the considerations that must be taken into account and provide guidance as to how
they are to be balanced, rather than simply prohibiting a particular outcome.31 The
rules are a detailed articulation of general principles, such as the principles of distinction, proportionality and military necessity.
Geneva law, on the other hand, is focused on the actual or potential victim,
rather than the perpetrator. Many, but by no means all, of the issues that it addresses arise away from the immediate field of battle. The law tends to prohibit
certain results or outcomes, usually by requiring certain forms of behavior. The
bottom line and the most appropriate behavior in a particular situation are likely
to be much closer in the case of Geneva law than Hague law. If Hague law is
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principally directed at the individual operator, Geneva law appears to focus more
on the obligations of a party to the conflict. Geneva law provides answers or required outcomes, but Hague law provides tools enabling the operator to arrive at an
answer in a specific situation. To that extent, Geneva law appears to address types
of situations, rather than specific ones. The nature of Geneva law may make it easier to mesh with HRsL than is the case with Hague law. If, in the case of Geneva
law, it is a question of finding an accommodation between LOAC and HRsL, in
the case of a significant portion of Hague law it is a matter of making a choice.
That is a product not only of the content of the rules but also of the nature of the
separate legal subsystems.
The internal logic of the two subsystems is therefore significantly different, with
considerable implications for their functioning as systems. This is reflected in presumptions, qualifications and limitations contained within the rules. If a goal of
the Geneva Conventions is the protection of victims, it may mean that qualifications to a rule have the nature of exceptions and suggests that they should be interpreted restrictively. This would reinforce the parallel with HRsL. Hague law has no
overarching goal. It seeks rather to establish a balance, one between humanitarian
considerations and military necessity. To that end, there can be no default position
or presumption in favor of either side of the equation. The rule itself contains the
balance. There can be no appeal to military necessity outside the formulation of the
rule. Equally, as a matter of law, there can be no appeal to humanitarian concerns
outside the rule. There is no need to interpret limitations32 restrictively. They
should be given their natural meaning.
Additional Protocol I appeared to merge Hague law and Geneva law. It is not,
however, possible to “merge” two sets of rules that function in quite different ways.
It might be possible to change each set of rules and to produce an entirely new type
of rule, but that was not done. Rather, Protocol I contained some sections and provisions of a Hague-law type and some of a Geneva-law type. Additional Protocol II,
which is largely a development of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of
1949, is principally an example of Geneva law, but it does contain some Haguetype provisions, unlike Common Article 3.
The specific question being explored in this article is targeting and the decision
to open fire. Is that a matter of Hague law or Geneva law? While it might be
tempting to see civilians at risk from the fighting as an additional class of victim
to be protected under Geneva law, it is submitted that that analysis is flawed. The
categories of victims protected by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 share two
characteristics. They have been adversely affected by the armed conflict and they
are vulnerable because they are in the power of the other side.33 Their protection
does not, by and large, affect the conduct of hostilities, although it will be
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necessary to divert resources that could have been used for other purposes to effect their protection.34 Civilians in need of protection from the fighting do not fit
within this framework. Their vulnerability arises not from the adversary but from
the fact of the fighting. They need protection from their own side as much as
from the enemy. Any measures to improve their protection will have a direct impact on the conduct of hostilities. In other words, rules on targeting and opening
fire form part of Hague law, even if part of their object is the protection of the civilian population.
The Distinction between Treaty Law and Customary Law in LOAC
Treaty Law
Geneva Law. There is detailed and extensive provision in treaty law for Genevalaw-type issues in IACs. There is fairly detailed provision for such issues in treaties
applicable in NIACs, with two significant exceptions—grounds for detention and
the status of members of opposing organized armed groups. This is a logical consequence of the situations in question. Domestic law, possibly emergency law, is
available to deal with the grounds for detention, at least in the case of internal
NIACs. No sovereign State claiming a monopoly on the lawful use of force can
logically admit that organized armed opponents have a special status or are acting
other than unlawfully. To do so would be to recognize the belligerency, thereby
making the conflict effectively subject to the IAC rules. There are some NIAC
Geneva-type rules across the very low threshold of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949. Those basic rules are further developed in situations
that cross the significantly higher threshold for the applicability of Additional
Protocol II.
Hague Law. The situation is very different in the case of Hague law. Again, there is
detailed regulation of the means and methods of fighting in treaties applicable in
IACs. There are no treaty rules of a Hague-law type in Common Article 3 NIACs,
however, and only very basic provisions in NIACs to which Additional Protocol II
is applicable. The one exception is rules on specific conventional weapons, where
the recent trend in treaty law is to make the same rules applicable in IACs and
NIACs.35 The treaties do not explain whether NIACs refer to all such conflicts or
only those that cross the threshold of Additional Protocol II.36
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Customary Law
Geneva Law. Assuming that the ICRC’s Customary International Humanitarian
Law37 study, reinforced by the caselaw of the ICTY and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Statute of the International Criminal Court in
the specific field of criminal rather than civil obligations, offers a fairly accurate
guide to customary law rules of a Geneva-law type, there is a close match between
treaty provisions and customary law in both IACs and NIACs. Again, it is necessary
to exclude rules on grounds for detention and the status of organized armed opponents in the case of NIACs.
Hague Law. The situation is very different in the case of Hague-law rules. There is
a significant overlap in treaty and customary law rules of a Hague-law type in IACs
but not in NIACs. The caselaw of the ICTY and ICTR and the Statute of the International Criminal Court, together with the customary law study, suggest that there
are extensive and detailed customary rules of a Hague-law type in NIACs, even
though there are no or only rudimentary treaty provisions. In reaching such conclusions, not one of those sources distinguishes between Common Article 3 NIACs
and Additional Protocol II NIACs. This is surprising given that there are no
Hague-law-type treaty rules in Common Article 3 NIACs. They only appear in
treaty law when a NIAC crosses the very high threshold for the applicability of Additional Protocol II. The most remarkable legal source in this respect is the Statute
of the International Criminal Court, the only source based on inter-State negotiation. The negotiators took as their criterion for inclusion in the list of war crimes
that the act was regarded as a war crime in customary international law.38 The list in
the Statute of Hague-law war crimes in NIACs is much shorter than that in IACs
and, most notably, does not include launching an indiscriminate or disproportionate attack. The negotiating States are likely to have been influenced by the customary war crimes in NIACs “discovered” by the ICTY and ICTR. It is nevertheless
surprising that in the definition of NIACs in the Statute no distinction is drawn between Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II situations.39 It would be rash
to assume that the Statute of the International Criminal Court is evidence that the
distinction no longer matters. The last time that States elaborated general rules for
NIACs, they went out of their way to create a threshold of applicability much
higher than Common Article 3. Nor should it be assumed that the ICRC’s customary law study is not controversial. In fact, that is far from being the case, particularly with regard to Hague-law-type issues.40
It is suggested that alleged customary NIAC rules of a Hague-law type that do
not bear a close relationship to the NIAC treaty rules should be handled with some
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care. The problem is not that such rules risk posing an undue and unwarranted obligation on States;41 it is rather that the alleged customary rules may imply a shift
from a law and order paradigm to an armed conflict paradigm at an inappropriately low level of disruption. Since Geneva-law rules are focused on the protection
of victims and bear a significant similarity to the approach of HRsL, their applicability at the Common Article 3 threshold does not appear to be too problematic. It
is specifically customary rules of Hague law that give rise to this difficulty. More
particularly, it is LOAC rules that permit action to be taken, rather than LOAC rules
that prohibit attacks against certain types of targets or the use of certain weapons,
that cause the problem.
When the alleged applicability of customary Hague rules in a NIAC means
that objects indispensable to the civilian population cannot be targeted or that
anti-personnel land mines cannot be used, there is clearly no conflict between
such a rule and HRsL. The situation is very different if the applicability of customary Hague rules in all NIACs means that an individual can be targeted by virtue of
being a member of an organized armed group exercising a continuous combat
function—in other words, by reference to status—rather than on account of the
threat posed by his behavior.42 In low-intensity armed conflicts, the situation is
likely to be made worse if armed forces target by reference to status rather than behavior. Mistakes and “collateral casualties” may be even less well tolerated by the
civilian population than in high-intensity NIACs. The issue is not whether armed
forces can be used to deal with organized armed violence during an emergency, but
whether whatever forces are used are applying rules based on a law and order paradigm or an armed conflict paradigm.
Consider the example of “Bloody Sunday.”43 For the sake of argument, let us
assume, first, that the events happened today; second, that the situation in
(London)Derry is to be characterized as coming within Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions;44 and, finally, that it is lawful under LOAC rules to open fire
against an individual because of his membership in an organized armed group exercising a continuous combat function.45 Since the armed forces are unlikely to
have membership lists of illegal organized armed groups, a membership test has to
be understood as referring to presumed membership. It is not clear how that is to
be determined. Can it seriously be suggested that it would be appropriate if international law allowed the British armed forces to open fire against any presumed
member of the IRA, irrespective of what he was doing at the time? Would it be sufficient if international law gave them that authority but a commander chose to act
within greater restrictions than the law allowed and ordered his forces only to open
fire in self-defense?46 In other words, should such discretion have been allowed to a
military commander or should international law have required him to act within a
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law and order paradigm? That is the kind of problem thrown up by the alleged applicability of customary Hague rules in all NIACs, rather than in those of sufficient
intensity as to make Additional Protocol II applicable.
The Literal Meaning of “Direct Participation in Hostilities” and the
Interpretive Guidance
According to treaty law, at least in the case of IACs, there exist only two possible
statuses under LOAC in relation to the law on the conduct of hostilities: combatant
and civilian.47 The term “combatant” does not describe persons who fight, but
persons who are entitled to fight. A combatant has the right to kill and, equally,
can be killed by opposing combatants by virtue of having that status.48 It does not
matter what he is doing at the time he is killed. Only combatants can be targeted
by virtue of status alone. The only other people who can be the target of attack are
persons who are taking a direct part in hostilities. The status of combatant exists
only in IACs. While it is readily understandable that members of an organized
armed group are not regarded as combatants, implying as it does an entitlement to
fight, this does raise an interesting question about the status of members of the
State’s armed forces.49 If there is no combatant status in NIACs, are they civilians?
Although an individual has no right in international law to participate in a NIAC,
he is not committing an international crime by doing so, but obviously he is very
likely to be committing a crime under domestic law. Similarly, he will not commit
an international crime if he kills a member of the State’s armed forces or a member
of another organized group, but he will commit an international crime if he
breaches the rules on the conduct of hostilities by intentionally killing a civilian,
for example.
The treaty rule that addresses DPH is the same in IACs and NIACs. Civilians enjoy the protection afforded against the effects of hostilities “unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”50 Whatever the difficulties regarding
the time during which a person can be attacked or the conduct that constitutes
“taking a direct part,” it is clear that the person has to be doing something that
makes him a target of attack. In other words, that depends on behavior and not status. Two different types of problems confront armed forces trying to determine
who can be targeted. First, the situations in which armed forces find themselves
have evolved significantly since 1977. “A continuous shift of the conduct of hostilities into civilian population centres has led to an increasing intermingling of civilians with armed actors and has facilitated their involvement in activities more
closely related to military operations.”51 A more recent phenomenon is the
outsourcing of traditionally military functions. This could result in people appearing to be members of the military and to be engaged in hostilities when that is not,
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in fact, the case. Alternatively, people could appear to be civilians but also appear to
be involved in military activities. In other words, the factual situations in which
members of the armed forces find themselves are increasingly confused. This must
make it difficult to apply any rule, even if they knew what the rule meant.
The second difficulty concerns the formulation of the rule itself. What is the
period of time covered by “unless and for such time as”? When does it start and
when does it end? Which activities constitute “participation” and what is the distinction between direct and indirect participation?
It is likely that there is an additional element of frustration and that is with the
content of the rule. Imagine that there is significant evidence that X has been and is
actively participating in hostilities, but the evidence is not of a quantity, type or
character as to enable detention on a criminal charge. The armed forces cannot target X unless they catch him in the act of participating, even though he may be responsible for many deaths.
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the ICRC sought to clarify the
meaning of the rule.52 The Interpretive Guidance was the product of extensive consultation with experts who were consulted in their personal capacity, but is exclusively the responsibility of the ICRC. Much of the content, particularly in relation
to IACs, is relatively uncontroversial. In non-IAC situations, however, that is not
the case. In those instances, the Guidance is very controversial from various and
sometimes conflicting standpoints.53 The clarification of the constitutive elements
of direct participation and of the beginning and end of direct participation will not
be considered further here. What will be examined is the withdrawal of civilian status from members of organized armed groups in NIACs and its implications for
the interoperability of LOAC and HRsL.
The Interpretive Guidance treats civilians differently in IACs and NIACs. Since
an IAC by definition involves at least two States on opposing sides, there is no
shortage of “parties” to such a conflict. The Interpretive Guidance restates the usual
test for combatant status.54 All other persons are civilians but they may forfeit protection from attack if they take a direct part in hostilities. In other words, loss of
protection depends on the behavior of the individual. The Interpretive Guidance
clarifies both the meaning of direct participation and also the time during which
protection is lost. These clarifications have implications for loss of protection by
civilians in IACs, but loss of protection is still dependent on behavior.
The situation with regard to NIACs is very different. A person is no longer to be
regarded as a civilian if he is a member of an organized armed group of a party to
the conflict. Members of an organized armed group constitute the armed forces of
a non-State party to the conflict and consist only of individuals who exercise continuous combat functions.55 This clearly means that an individual can be targeted
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on account of his status as a presumed member of such a group and not on account
of his behavior at the time he is targeted. Given the greater flexibility introduced as
a result of the clarification of “unless and for such time as” and “direct participation,” it is not clear why it was thought necessary to address the status of a fighter in
a NIAC at all. After all, no change appears to have been introduced to the status of a
civilian who takes a direct part in hostilities in an IAC. That possibly represents an
oversimplification. In an IAC, civilians who belong to an armed group that does
not belong to a party to a conflict can indeed only be targeted if they take a direct
part in hostilities. Many such groups will, however, belong to a party to the conflict,
even if they do not form part of its regular armed forces. That party, which is by
definition a State, will have responsibility in international law for the conduct of
those armed forces.56 In other cases, the armed group may belong to a party that is
not a State but which is involved in an armed conflict against a party to the IAC.
The Interpretive Guidance suggests that in such a case two armed conflicts will be
occurring in parallel; an IAC between two States and a NIAC between the nonState party and one of the States parties. In that case, who can be targeted will be determined by the Interpretive Guidance principles applicable in NIACs.57 If anything, that reinforces the point that the impact of the Guidance proposal only arises
in NIACs.
The principal justification suggested for denying civilian status to members of
organized armed groups exercising continuous combat functions, while not also
granting them combatant status, is the principle of distinction.58 There is a need to
distinguish between civilians and those who act like the armed forces of a party to
the conflict. It is said that Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
implies that both the State and non-State groups have armed forces.59 Less convincingly, it is argued that Additional Protocol II makes a distinction between
those who take a direct part in hostilities and the forces that are capable of conducting sustained and concerted military operations.60 The Interpretive Guidance acknowledges that it is difficult to establish the membership of an organized armed
group, in contrast to membership of the armed forces or other official armed
group.61 It is difficult to see how “continuous combat function” can be established
other than by conduct, in which case we are driven back to a behavior test. It should
be emphasized that loss of status does not depend on membership of a party to the
conflict, or even of membership of an armed group belonging to such a party. It is
also necessary to establish that the individual exercises a continuous combat
function.
Superficially, it might appear that the proposal supports the principle of the
equality of belligerents, in that both parties are recognized as having armed forces.
In fact, however, the members of an organized armed group exercising continuous
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combat functions lose civilian immunity from attack but do not gain the privileges
of a combatant.
It could, perhaps with equal plausibility, be argued that the principle of distinction is based on the idea that there are only two statuses in LOAC: that of combatant and that of civilian.62 A combatant is someone who has the right to take part in
the hostilities and who therefore has the right to kill opposing combatants. Anyone
who is not a combatant, therefore anyone who does not have those rights, is a civilian. In that case, members of organized armed groups must be civilians unless the
opposing party recognizes their combatant status. Immunity from attack could be
lost but only on the basis of the individual’s behavior.
The Interpretive Guidance just refers to NIACs and does not distinguish between
Common Article 3 NIACs and Additional Protocol II NIACs. That is why the
“Bloody Sunday” example discussed earlier represents a problem. The Interpretive
Guidance approach would be easier to defend if it were restricted to situations
above the threshold of applicability of Additional Protocol II, at least with regard to
the level and nature of the violence.63
At present, there are two principal difficulties for armed forces: the scope of the
rule and uncertain facts. Other aspects of the Interpretive Guidance address the
temporal and functional issues. It is not clear why it was thought necessary to address the question of status before determining the impact of those clarifications.
The bigger difficulty is uncertainty about the facts. It is hard to see how the Guidance helps there. The ability to target by reference to status depends on the ability to
establish that the person targeted was a member of an organized armed group that
belonged to a party to the conflict and the person fulfilled a continuous combat
function within the group. This is likely to pose a real challenge to armed forces if
such a determination is to be based on fact rather than a vague hunch.
Perhaps as a counterweight to the withdrawal of civilian status from certain
fighters, the Interpretive Guidance emphasizes that, when an individual can be the
target of an attack, the kind and degree of force used must “not exceed what is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing circumstances.”64 The Interpretive Guidance suggests that, in circumstances when it would
not increase the risk to the opposing armed forces or to other civilians, the threat
posed by the individual might be neutralized by measures short of the use of lethal
force, notably detention.65 It is submitted that this represents dangerous category
confusion.66 Key features of a law and order paradigm are, first, that force is used as
a last resort and, second, that priority should be given to an attempt to detain. The
essential feature of an armed conflict paradigm, as far as Hague-type rules are concerned, is that there is no obligation to detain. An individual can be targeted by virtue of his status, irrespective of what he is actually doing at the time, or on the basis
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of his behavior at the time. As a matter of law, the combination of a right to use
deadly force and a requirement to use the minimum force necessary would appear
to be incoherent.67
It is submitted that there is a better solution, even in purely LOAC terms. It
would also have the additional benefit of making easier the operationalization of
the relationship between LOAC and HRsL.
IV. A Comparison of the Basis for Opening Fire under HRsL and LOAC
As indicated above, the majority of human rights treaties prohibit arbitrary killings without defining the term. The meaning to be given to “arbitrary” becomes
apparent through an examination of the practice of treaty bodies in exercising
their monitoring functions and particularly through the caselaw arising out of
individual complaints. In this context, it is also relevant to consider the analysis in
the report to the UN Human Rights Council of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions.68
It is clear from the caselaw that the prohibition on arbitrary killings is applied
strictly in the case of deaths resulting from the acts of State agents.69 The only basis
for opening fire is the behavior of the individual at the time, including the risk
posed by the individual to himself or others. It is conceivable that it might, in limited circumstances, be interpreted more broadly. It might be possible to argue that
the agent could justify opening fire against an individual on account of the general
risk he poses, rather than the risk posed by his behavior at the time.70 It would,
however, be necessary to establish why, if his behavior is not dangerous at the time,
he cannot be detained. The use of potentially lethal force has to be a last resort.
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR) is unusual in that it defines exhaustively the only circumstances in which resort may be
had to potentially lethal force.71 All those circumstances are based on a law and order paradigm, and are based on the behavior of the individual at the time. Furthermore, the test is not that the use of potentially lethal force is reasonably necessary
but that it is absolutely necessary.72 In addition, the Convention requires that the
State take measures to protect the right to life. This has been interpreted, in the case
of planned operations, as requiring security forces to take measures to try to prevent the need to resort to potentially lethal force73 and to protect other civilians in
the vicinity from the risk of being injured or killed.74 This can result in the State being
held responsible for a death that resulted from the use of inappropriate weapons.75
All the treaty bodies require both lawful grounds for resorting to potentially
lethal force and also that the force used be proportionate. This does not mean
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proportionality as it is understood in LOAC but that the force used is proportionate to the risk posed by the individual at the time.76
The analysis has so far considered the requirements of HRsL in a “normal” context. The question arises of how the rules are modified, if at all, by the existence of a
situation of emergency or armed conflict. All the treaty bodies, other than the
ECHR, provide that the prohibition of arbitrary killing is non-derogable. Prima facie,
this means that it applies also in such situations. It is, however, possible that the
meaning of “arbitrary” has sufficient flexibility to apply in a different way in such
situations. There appears as yet to be no human rights caselaw involving killings
arising out of circumstances in which LOAC indisputably applies a status test—in
other words, in IACs. There are relevant cases currently pending before the
ECtHRs. There is, however, caselaw arising out of situations in which the Interpretive Guidance would suggest that targeting by reference to status is legitimate—in
other words, the targeting, in every type of NIAC, of a member of an organized
armed group exercising a continuous combat function. The author is not aware of
any such situation where the State invoked LOAC or the State claimed such a basis
for opening fire. On the contrary, States have argued, successfully or otherwise,
that the behavior of those targeted justified the resort to potentially lethal force
and/or that the force used was proportionate.
The ECHR is again different in that it provides, “No derogation from Article 2,
except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war . . . shall be made under
this provision.”77 This either represents a possible derogation or a defense. No State
has ever invoked the article, even where the alleged violation of Article 2 occurred
during the course of an armed conflict to which Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions was arguably applicable.
It is submitted that human rights bodies appear to be wedded to a behavior test.
Even assuming that they wish to give effect to the directions of the ICJ that, when
both LOAC and HRsL are applicable, they should apply LOAC as the lex specialis,
they are likely to be reluctant to go back on existing caselaw, either in NIACs generally or specifically in the case of NIACs between the threshold of Common Article 3
and that of Additional Protocol II.
The basis of targeting in LOAC will be set out baldly here, since it has already
been the subject of discussion. In IACs, there appears to be a close relationship between the rules of treaty law and customary law. Under both, the following may be
targeted by virtue of their status as combatants: members of the armed forces of a
party to the IAC, members of a militia belonging to that party and members of a
levée en masse. Others may only be targeted if they take a direct part in hostilities, either as interpreted on the basis of treaty law or as interpreted in the light of the Interpretive Guidance.
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In the case of NIACs, there is a marked difference between treaty law and what
some allege to be customary law. Under treaty law, there is no guidance as to who
may be targeted and on what basis under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. That presumably falls to be regulated by domestic law and HRsL. Where
a NIAC crosses the much higher threshold necessary to make Additional Protocol
II applicable, a person may only be targeted for taking a DPH. A person cannot be
targeted by virtue of his status.
An analysis of the position under customary law requires a distinction to be
drawn between customary law without the Interpretive Guidance and customary
law taking it into account. The expansive view, based on the Customary International Humanitarian Law study, the caselaw of the ICTY and ICTR, and the provisions of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, suggests that in all NIACs
a person can be targeted only if he takes a direct part in hostilities. This is not the
same as the human rights test based on the threat posed by the behavior of the individual at the time, but it is at least based on behavior. It might be possible for
human rights bodies to accommodate themselves to that slight widening of the
concept of threat, particularly those bodies applying a prohibition of “arbitrary
killings.” The picture changes if we take account of the Interpretive Guidance. On
that basis, a person may be targeted in all NIACs either on account of his taking a
direct part in hostilities or because he is a member of an organized armed group
belonging to a party to the conflict and exercising a continuous combat function.
That last element involves targeting on the basis of status and doing so in a situation in which human rights bodies have hitherto applied, without apparent controversy, a behavior test. That is likely to complicate rather than to facilitate the
operationalization of the relationship between LOAC and HRsL.
V. Conclusion
A human rights body, trying to give effect to the principle articulated by the ICJ,
has to decide first whether LOAC is applicable.78 It then has to decide what LOAC
says. In order to identify the relevant LOAC rule, it has to characterize the armed
conflict as an IAC or a NIAC. If it is an IAC, the possible distinction between treaty
LOAC and customary LOAC is unlikely to be of major importance. That is not the
case in relation to NIACs. The human rights body needs to know whether it should
only apply treaty law, in which case there is a significant difference between situations within Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and those in which Additional Protocol II is applicable. On the other hand, if they are to apply both treaty
and customary law, they have the unenviable task of determining the content of
customary NIAC rules. The arguments as to the content of customary NIAC rules
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are not for academics in ivory towers, dancing on the head of a pin; they have considerable practical importance.
It is submitted that human rights bodies are likely to see themselves as having
four options:
(1) They could regard LOAC as silent with regard to the basis for targeting in
low-intensity armed conflicts, therefore applying their usual test under
human rights law and limiting the application of DPH to conflicts in
which Additional Protocol II was applicable.79 This would still involve
the application of a behavior test, but a slightly different one from the
peacetime test.
(2) They could apply DPH as the basis for targeting in all NIACs. This would
still involve the application of a behavior test, but again a slightly different one from the peacetime test.
(3) They could regard LOAC as silent with regard to the basis for targeting in
low-intensity armed conflicts, therefore applying their usual test, but in
this instance applying both DPH and a status test (member of an organized armed group exercising a continuous combat function) in situations in which Additional Protocol II was applicable.
(4) They could use DPH as the basis for targeting in low-intensity armed
conflicts and apply both DPH and a status test in situations in which Additional Protocol II was applicable.
The one thing that human rights bodies are unlikely to accept is the application
of a status test in low-intensity armed conflicts.80 That is, however, precisely what
the Interpretive Guidance proposes with regard to members of organized armed
groups exercising continuous combat functions. The Interpretive Guidance has
therefore complicated, rather than made easier, the relationship between LOAC and
HRsL. The Interpretive Guidance makes it clear that it is only addressing LOAC and
not other bodies of rules.81 That is unhelpful since the majority of States have obligations under both LOAC and HRsL. There would appear to be little point in suggesting that States can target by reference to status in all NIACs if HRsL precludes
that possibility, at least in the case of low-intensity armed conflicts.82 The only situation in which such a LOAC rule would conceivably be relevant would be a transnational NIAC, if and only if HRsL was not applicable extraterritorially in the
particular circumstances.83 The Interpretive Guidance should either have confined
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targeting by status to situations in which Additional Protocol II was applicable or
not used targeting by status at all.
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Law Commission on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/
guide/1_10.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
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25. It is likely to be more relevant to measures taken domestically on account of the IAC, e.g.,
evacuation or detention of enemy aliens.
26. The ECHR, supra note 9, art. 15; ACHR, supra note 9, art. 27, and ICCPR, supra note 10,
art. 4, expressly envisage the possibility that there may be an emergency within a State of such a
character as to require the State to take exceptional measures and to prevent it from applying
ordinary measures in the usual way. The treaties provide that, in such a situation, the State may
modify the scope of certain of its human rights obligations, subject to procedural requirements
with regard to notification. The process is known as derogation. Certain rights are nonderogable (e.g., the prohibition of arbitrary killings under the ICCPR and the ACHR, and of torture under all three treaties; see further infra). Even potentially derogable rights may have a nonderogable core. For example, a derogation to the usual requirements with regard to detention
may justify a longer than usual period before a detainee is brought before a judicial officer or
administrative detention but it will never justify enforced disappearances. See generally U.N.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 on
Art. 4 ICCPR, ¶ 16 (2001); Hampson, supra note 3, 492–94.
27. Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 28–29 (1961).
28. Brogan & Others v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 11209/84, 11234/84, 11266/84 & 11386/
85, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117 (1988) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, App.
Nos. 14553/89 & 14554/89, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 29 (1993); Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur.
Ct. H.R. 2260.
29. For example, if in an IAC a commander gave the order that armed forces could only open
fire in self-defense and a member of the armed forces deliberately killed a combatant who did not
pose a threat to him, the soldier has not acted in violation of LOAC but could be punished for
disobeying a lawful order.
30. That is usually the case under domestic law. Under most HRsL, the test is whether a killing is arbitrary. What is arbitrary in peacetime is not the same as that which is arbitrary in time of
conflict. The caselaw of human rights bodies suggests that peacetime killings are analyzed in
terms of a law and order paradigm. Article 2 of the ECHR is different and unique in that it sets
out the only grounds on which a State may resort to the use of potentially lethal force. Those
grounds are based on a law and order paradigm. See further note 71 infra and accompanying text.
31. An obvious exception is the absolute prohibition of intentional attacks against civilians
and the civilian population. The distinction between Hague-law prohibitions and Hague-law
permissions will be considered further below.
32. E.g., “for reasons of imperative military necessity” and “unless circumstances do not
permit.”
33. An exception is Geneva Convention IV, supra note 20, Part 2, which addresses the “general protection of populations against certain consequences of war.”
34. E.g., evacuating and caring for the wounded and sick, and using members of the armed
forces to run prisoner of war camps.
35. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, reprinted in 19 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1523
(1980). Amended Article 1 made the Convention as a whole and therefore all its protocols applicable in both IACs and NIACs. Amendment to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Doc. No. CCW/CONF/II/2 (Dec. 21, 2001). A subsequent
Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V), Nov. 27, 2003, U.N. Doc. CCW/MSP/
2003/2, was therefore applicable in both IACs and NIACs from the start. That change had already

209

Vol 87.ps
C:\_WIP\_Blue Book\_Vol 87\_Ventura\Vol 87.vp
Friday, June 10, 2011 9:03:22 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

DPH and the Interoperability of LOAC and Human Rights Law
been made with regard to the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), Oct. 13, 1995,
U.N. Doc. CCW/CONF.I/7 (Oct. 12, 1995) as a result of the 2001 amendment and the Amended
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices
(Amended Protocol II), May 3, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-1 (1997) was applicable in both
IACs and NIACs from the start as a result of Article 1.2 of the Protocol.
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211, reprinted in 36
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1507 (1997) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions,
Dec. 3, 2008, 48 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 357 (2008) prohibit the use of the weapons
defined in those treaties in all circumstances, therefore in both IACs and NIACs.
The significance of the distinction between Hague-law prohibitions and Hague-law permissive rules will be considered further.
36. There is a real difficulty in making the weapons rules applicable in both situations, but it
is not attributable to the distinction between prohibitions and permissions in Hague law, rather
to the paradigm confusion between law and order/law enforcement and an armed conflict paradigm. Certain weapons that are traditionally used and have an important role to play in law enforcement are prohibited in IACs, most notably expanding bullets and riot control agents, such
as tear gas. The increasing complexity of modern conflict, sometimes characterized as “threeblock warfare,” results in different rules being applicable in different situations at the same time.
The difficulties to which that gives rise in practice are likely to be exacerbated if the clear distinction between what is permitted and prohibited in different situations and paradigms becomes
blurred. An example of such confusion is Resolution RC/Res.5 adopted at the Review Conference of the Rome Statute on June 8, 2010, which adds to the list of war crimes in NIACs “(xv)
Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard
envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions.” Resolutions and
Declarations adopted by the Review Conference, http://212.159.242.181/iccdocs/asp_docs/
ASP9/OR/RC-11-Part.II-ENG.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
The difficulties would be reduced if the changes were confined to situations in which Additional Protocol II is applicable, since an armed conflict paradigm is more clearly applicable in
such situations than those in which the level of violence comes within Common Article 3 but not
Additional Protocol II. It should be noted that, in some circumstances, Additional Protocol II
will not be applicable for a different reason. If State A is engaged in an armed conflict in State B
against a non-State armed group based in State B, Additional Protocol II is not applicable since
the State in whose territory the conflict is being fought is not a State party to the conflict. Nevertheless, the level of violence and the degree of organization and control of the non-State actor
might be sufficient to satisfy the high threshold of Additional Protocol II were it not for this barrier to its applicability.
37. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 23.
38. Knut Dörmann, War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
with a Special Focus on the Negotiations on the Elements of Crimes, in 7 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF
UNITED NATIONS LAW 341, 345 (Armin von Bogdandy & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2003). The one
exception was anything addressing the recruitment or use of child soldiers, which was an example of
progressive development. It appears to be universally acceptable as a rule, if not in the observance.
39. Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8.2(d) & (f), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90. Interestingly the definition of “an armed conflict not of an international character” differs
slightly as between the list of criminalized violations of Common Article 3 and other
criminalized violations. In the case of the former, the list of crimes “does not apply to situations
of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other
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acts of a similar nature.” This reflects Article 1.2 of Additional Protocol II of 1977. In the case of
war crimes in NIACs not based on Common Article 3, the definition in Article 8.2(f) starts in the
same way but continues, “It [paragraph 2(e)] applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups.” The reference to “protracted” is not to be
found in Common Article 3 itself but is one of the elements thought necessary to constitute an
armed conflict by the ICTY, as reflected by the judgment in the Tadic case, supra note 18. It is not
clear whether this is simply intended to serve as a definition of a Common Article 3 NIAC (in
which case why was the same text not included in subparagraph d?) or whether it is intended to
create a new threshold in the case of war crimes not based on Common Article 3. If the threshold
is different, it would explain why it is not used in subparagraph d. It is not clear whether the
threshold is higher or merely different.
40. John B. Bellinger III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 443 (2007). See generally PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ICRC STUDY, supra note 6. The study has been challenged on a variety of grounds. Some have
questioned the nature of some of the materials used as evidence of State practice. Others have
questioned the sufficiency of the evidence used to establish the existence of a rule. Yet others accept the manner in which a rule is formulated but challenge the accuracy of the commentary.
41. While the focus in this text is on the responsibilities of States, since only States (and arguably quasi-State entities) have legal obligations under HRsL, it should not be forgotten that the
applicability of customary LOAC rules of a Hague-law type across the threshold merely of Common Article 3 would have implications for non-State organized armed groups.
42. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 1. See further discussion infra pp. 198–202, The
Literal Meaning of “Direct Participation” in Hostilities and the Interpretive Guidance.
43. See REPORT OF THE BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY (2010), available at http://report.bloody
-sunday-inquiry.org/. The author has chosen to call the city of Northern Ireland where the
events of Bloody Sunday occurred, known as both Derry and Londonderry, (London)Derry, so
as to accommodate both the Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist views of the name.
44. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom denied that the situation in Northern Ireland ever crossed the threshold of Common Article 3. Many members of the
Army Legal Services appear to be of the view that at certain times and in certain places the situation did cross that threshold.
45. Proposed as the test in all NIACs in the Interpretive Guidance. See INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 36.
46. At the time, as a matter of domestic law, the armed forces only had the same authority as
a policeman to open fire and that was based on a law and order paradigm.
47. The term “combatant” is used in Additional Protocol I (e.g., Articles 43 and 44) and replaces the use of “belligerent” in Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2227 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. Article 50 of Additional Protocol I effectively defines civilians as persons who are not combatants. The terms are therefore mutually exclusive
and no one can fall in between the two. Combatants include not only members of the regular
armed forces, but also members of a militia who satisfy the requirements of Article 43 of Additional Protocol I or Article 1 of the Hague Regulations, supra, and members of a levée en masse
under Article 2 of the same treaty.
48. Additional Protocol I, supra note 19, art. 43.2. A combatant cannot be prosecuted for the
fact of fighting or for killing opposing combatants.
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49. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 27.
50. Additional Protocol I, supra note 20, art. 51.3; Additional Protocol II, supra note 19, art.
13.3.
51. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 11.
52. The Interpretive Guidance is clear that it is not intended to and does not effect any change
in the law. See, e.g., id. at 19.
53. For detailed scrutiny of the Interpretive Guidance, see Forum, The ICRC Interpretive
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian
Law, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 637 (2010).
The whole issue is devoted to the Guidance. This article criticizes it from a standpoint not addressed in other writings, which tend to focus on an exclusively LOAC perspective.
54. See supra note 47.
55. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 27.
56. Id. at 23.
57. Id. at 24.
58. Id. at 27–28.
59. Id. at 28.
60. Id. at 29.
61. Id. at 32–33.
62. Article 50.1 of Additional Protocol I, in effect, defines a civilian as any person who is not
a combatant.
63. See comment in supra note 36 on the circumstances in which only Common Article 3
will be applicable, notwithstanding the existence of a level and nature of violence as to satisfy the
threshold of Additional Protocol II.
64. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 82.
65. Id. at 81.
66. See generally W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities”
Study: No Mandate, No Expertise and Legally Incorrect, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 769, 801–2 (2010).
67. In certain circumstances, it may make operational sense to say that armed forces are free
to target by reference to status but, if an opportunity arises to detain, they should do so, whether
in the hope of obtaining intelligence or to assist in the “battle for hearts and minds.” That is not
the same as combining the two elements. The default position is the targeting test. Detention is
merely an alternative option. See also Parks, id. at 809.
68. Alston Report, supra note 8. Since the mandate of Professor Alston, the Special Rapporteur preparing the report, contains no requirement that the victim be within the jurisdiction of
the State, his comments on the extraterritorial applicability of the obligation to protect the right
to life are not of direct assistance in determining the scope of applicability in the case of treaties
containing such a requirement. There is no reason to have any such reservation in relation to the
meaning to be ascribed to “arbitrary.” The mandate is generally interpreted as covering similar
ground to Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), and Article 6 of the ICCPR, supra note 10. In other words, it is not limited to executions but extends to killings generally. See
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Standards,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/executions/standards.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
69. See, e.g., Husband of Maria Fanny Suarez de Guerrero v. Colombia, Human Rights
Comm., 37th Sess., No. R.11/45, P 12.2, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) (1982); McCann v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 147–50 (1995).
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Those concerned with the relationship between LOAC and HRsL in the context of targeted
killings have paid considerable attention to “the targeted killings case.” Public Committee
against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, HCJ 769/02, Judgment (Dec. 13, 2006), 46
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 373 (2007), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/
02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf.
It should be noted that the Israeli court went out of its way to stress the very particular context
in which the case arose, that is, occupied territory adjacent to the territory of the occupying
power. See generally William J. Fenrick, The Targeted Killings Judgment and the Scope of Direct
Participation in Hostilities, 5 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 332–38 (2007).
70. Potentially, that could include behavior which constituted direct participation in hostilities but which did not represent a threat to others at the time.
71. Article 2 of the ECHR provides:
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. . . .
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article
when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in
defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to
prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
72. McCann v. United Kingdom, supra note 69, ¶ 149.
73. Id., ¶¶ 192–94.
74. Ergi v. Turkey, App. No. 23818/94, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 388 (1998).
75. Gulec v. Turkey, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121, ¶ 71 (1998).
76. Noam Lubell, Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict, 87
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 737, 745–46 (2005).
77. ECHR, supra note 9, art. 15.2.
78. Françoise J. Hampson, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights Law from the Perspective of a Human Rights Treaty Body, 90 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 549 (2008).
79. When the conflict is of the requisite intensity for Additional Protocol II to be applicable,
but it is not applicable because the conflict occurs in the territory of a State not a party to the conflict, it should be treated as an Additional Protocol II conflict for these purposes. It is beyond the
scope of this article to consider whether Article 1.1 of Additional Protocol II should be amended
to replace “its armed forces” by “the armed forces of a High Contracting Party.”
80. See generally David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 171
(2005).
81. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 11.
82. “Low-intensity conflict” is used so as to exclude situations in which only Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions is applicable, not on account of the limited intensity of the violence, but because the State in whose territory the conflict is fought is not a party to the conflict. See
supra notes 36 & 79.
83. The reference here is to a conflict in the territory of State B between the armed forces of
State A and a non-State actor in State B. Where State A is assisting State B in an armed conflict
against a non-State actor, State A is acting extraterritorially but the conflict is not transnational.
If the consent of State B is the basis for the presence of State A, State B may have the obligation,
under HRsL, to ensure that any State assisting it should respect State B’s human rights obligations. No issue would arise for State B as to the scope of the extraterritorial applicability of HRsL.
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